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Essay
Looking for a Few Good Philosopher Kings:
Political Gerrymandering as a Question of
Institutional Competence
LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER
The redistricting season is about to begin in full swing, and with it will
come renewed calls for the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme
Court, to aggressively review the work of the political branches. This is an
intriguing puzzle. Since the early 1960s, the federal courts have regulated
questions of politics aggressively. They have done this even in the face of
difficult questions of political representation. The courts have taken sides,
to be sure, but these can only be described as acts of volition and will, not
constitutional law. The leading case was Reynolds v. Sims. This was
when the Supreme Court ultimately divorced these political questions from
the constitutional text. Reynolds informed all subsequent case law within
the Law of Democracy. If the Court could decide Reynolds as it did, it
could decide anything. But this is not true for political gerrymandering
questions. What explains this hesitation on the part of the Justices? This
Essay answers this important question. Understanding the Justices as
strategic actors, this Essay conjectures that the Court removes itself as an
institutional player in the gerrymandering debate because the redistricting
process left alone tilts to conservative policies and outcomes. More
generally, this Essay argues that scholarly calls for judicial intervention
demand the existence of philosopher kings to choose amongst myriad
theories of representation. These are calls, in effect, for an activist judicial
role in an area that demands judicial deference. At the very least, this is
an area that demands comparative institutional analysis. This is
something we seldom see.
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Looking for a Few Good Philosopher Kings:
Political Gerrymandering as a Question of
Institutional Competence
LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional questions raised by the political gerrymander have
proven as elusive as any question of constitutional law of the past half
century. The reasons for this elusiveness remain shrouded in mystery.
This is an area, after all, where the consensus is almost unanimous in its
derision for the hated gerrymander and the intentional and harmful
manipulation of districting lines for political gain. According to their
many critics, these practices are anticompetitive,1 distortive,2 and may even
violate our political rights.3 Few commentators defend modern political
gerrymandering practices as a common good.4 Yet, puzzlingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court refuses to intervene and try its considerable hand at the
perceived problem. Citing a lack of judicially manageable standards, a
plurality recently argued that the practice raises a nonjusticiable political
question.5
One obvious way to answer this puzzle takes the Court on its own
terms and provides a judicially manageable standard. This is a popular
response. It is also quite uninspiring and even boring. This is because the
* Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 680–81 (1998) (“The task then is to discern which
regulations of politics are anticompetitive and lock up democratic competition in impermissible
ways . . . . Without a worked-out vision of appropriate partisan factors in redistricting, the Court was
able to hold partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional.”).
2
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy & Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 607 (2007)
(arguing that “the problem with political gerrymandering is the intentional manipulation of democratic
institutions by state actors”).
3
See generally, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003) (defending a rights-based model of judicial
review for election law); Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589
(1999) (same).
4
For notable exceptions, see THOMAS BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY
COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 113–14, 116–25 (2008) (proposing that the
government should draw highly uncompetitive, homogeneous districts in order to minimize
disproportionate electoral districts in the aggregate) and Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation
and Redistricting: The Case Against Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL.
431, 431–36 (2005) (“I argue that structuring our elections in such a way as to maximize competition
does not uniformly serve democratic interests.”).
5
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004).
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question at the heart of the gerrymandering debate is not really a question
of standards.6 Instead, the real question—to my mind the only question—
lies here: This is not a shy Court, unwilling and unable to take on the
pressing political issues of its day. From Guantánamo and questions of
war to questions of campaign finance law to even presidential elections,7
the modern Court is happy to take on any and all questions presented to it.
In the coming years, it even promises to take on the second
Reconstruction.8 Why then does the Court refuse to take on this issue?
What makes the political gerrymander a special case, a question outside of
the Court’s area of competence?
This short Essay sketches an answer to these questions as a way to
better understand the gerrymandering puzzle. The second question is
particularly important, because in order to make sense of the political
gerrymandering question as a legal question, we must treat it as a question
of institutional competence. To argue that political gerrymanders must
come to an end begs the question at the heart of constitutional law: Is the
Court the proper institution to take on this issue? This Essay argues that
absent egregious circumstances, redistricting questions in general and the
political gerrymander in particular raise questions that should remain
outside of the Court’s scope of review. Whether the political gerrymander
is a problem that must be solved by anyone, a persuasive argument is yet to
be made that the U.S. Supreme Court is the one institution to do so. This is
an argument in four Parts.
Part II sides with the rational choice tradition, which argues that the
Justices are strategic actors who understand that their preferred choices are
constrained by the preferred choices of others.9 This premise counsels for
a passive and deferential judicial role as a matter of course.10 This is
because while a strategic judge is ultimately seeking to see her preferred
policy choices reflected in law, she is not subject to the same electoral
6
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair
Representation, and the Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 438
(2006) [hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander].
7
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1–5 (2010) (striking portions of the
federal campaign finance law); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (discussing the
detainment of enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006)
(discussing a Yemeni national’s detainment at Guantánamo Bay); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–03
(2000) (interjecting itself into the presidential elections in 2000).
8
See generally Luis Fuentes-Rower, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the
Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125 (2010) [hereinafter FuentesRohwer, Future of Section 2] (contending that the Voting Rights Act is in constitutional danger).
9
See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–10 (1998) (contending that
Justices “are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on their own ideological
attitudes” but rather “strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a
consideration of the preferences of other actors”).
10
See, e.g., id. at 13 (advancing the idea that Justices must defer to, or consider the preferences of,
other actors—including the public—in order to see their favored policies become the law).
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checks as other political actors. This Part further argues that the Justices
must be especially deferential in the field of democracy and representation.
This is an area where the Justices risk replacing their personal goals for
those of the electorate, which is precisely what makes Bush v. Gore12 so
repulsive in the eyes of many.13 Unhappily, this Part argues that Bush v.
Gore is the norm, not the exception. This Part concludes that while
judicial intervention is sometimes necessary, it must be reserved for the
most extreme cases.
Part III argues that Baker v. Carr14 is the prototypical example of
legitimate judicial intervention. The political process in Tennessee in the
early 1960s was clearly a process where the body politic could not exact
any kind of meaningful change. This was the classic entrenchment
problem. Elected officials in Tennessee could not be dislodged from
power in any way absent violence or revolution. Mere voting could not do
it, and the state did not provide the public with a way to bypass legislative
choices on its own. As soon as Justice Clark recognized the problem for
what it was, the Court in Baker took the necessary step.15 But this Essay
argues Baker should stand alone in our constitutional constellation.
As Part IV explains, however, the Court took a different path.
Reynolds v. Sims16 changed everything. In Reynolds, the Court went much
farther than Baker ever intended to go and offered its very own
understanding of what redistricting plans must look like.17 From among all
the possibilities, the Court chose population equality as the value of choice
and enshrined it as the preferred constitutional value.18 To be sure,
population equality is easily defended as a legitimate constitutional value.
The criticism focuses on how the Court elevated it as the one value that
jurisdictions must follow and respect. For a time, this move looked like a
strategic miscalculation, as members of Congress took serious steps to
overturn the Court’s choice.19 More importantly, the Court’s move in
11

See id. at 17–18 (discussing the impact of the institution of life tenure on the Justices’ goals).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13
The Court, in Bush, appeared conscious that its decision would rouse controversy:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are Members
of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of this Constitution’s design to
leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legislatures, and to
the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.
Id. at 111.
14
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15
See HASEN, supra note 3, at 2, 4 (pointing out that Baker has now “been canonized as an
example of appropriate court intervention in the face of a failure in the political process”).
16
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17
Id. at 577–81.
18
Id. at 579.
19
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 231–37 (1964).
12
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Baker unnecessarily opened the Justices to the charge of activism, of acting
as philosopher kings.20 This criticism reflects the mind-set that the Court is
not the proper institution to cure all that ails our political culture. This is a
charge that remains to this day. Bush v. Gore is but one example among
many, of which Citizens United21 is only the latest exemplar.22 These cases
all trace back to Reynolds.
Finally, Part V examines the lessons of this shift in attitude for the
political gerrymander. This Part considers the gerrymandering question as
a practical question of drawing lines, as a question of strategic judicial
decision-making, and as an institutional question. This Part argues that the
line-drawing question must directly confront Frankfurter’s challenge. How
does one choose from among the myriad of possible factors? The strategic
model instead offers an intriguing puzzle: What explains the conservative
Justices’ reticence to take on these questions, considering the fact that they
are no different from the questions presented by Reynolds and its
considerable progeny?
Finally, the institutional question leads to the view that the Court
should follow its posture in Baker, not Reynolds. Instead, scholars who
write about the Court’s gerrymandering jurisprudence take the opposite
view. They are quick to offer their views about everything that ails our
political system and how the Court should cure our democracy.23 This Part
notes that these are calls to follow Reynolds, not Baker.24 More
importantly, these calls follow closely in the wake of the Court’s oftcriticized cases, such as District of Columbia v. Heller25 and Citizens
United.26 This Essay concludes that we cannot have it both ways. The
judicial activism that brought us Reynolds and Bush v. Gore is the same
activism needed for the Court to intervene in political gerrymandering
controversies.

20
Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander, supra note 6, at 430 (discussing the how the
Baker majority “believed that the Court can and should take a more active supervisory role in
redistricting controversies”).
21
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
22
Id. at 913, 914 (striking down select provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002).
23
See generally Charles, supra note 2; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1.
24
See infra text accompanying note 141.
25
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
26
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. The Court in Heller held that (1) the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms, (2) statutes banning handgun possession in the
home violated the Second Amendment, and (3) the Washington, D.C. statute containing a prohibition
against rendering any lawful firearm in the house operable for purposes of immediate self-defense
violated the Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE COURT ON ITS OWN TERMS:
STRATEGIES AND ATTITUDES
In order to make sense of the U.S. Supreme Court’s proper role within
the law of democracy,27 it is imperative to properly understand how the
Court arrives at its decisions. One popular approach in law schools—for
support, one need only open a first-year law book—is to place the legal
model at the center of the Court’s work. This is a model where law and
precedent constrain judges and where extralegal factors, such as the
judges’ backgrounds or political preferences, play no role at all. The legal
model is analogized to a “quest for the holy grail of perfect, nonpolitical,
aloof neutral law and legal decisions[.]”28 Under the legal model, a judge
is faithful only to the law. Right answers to legal questions exist, and it is
up to the judge to figure out what these answers are. Everything else is
unimportant. This is what Frank Cross and Blake Nelson call the “naïve
legal model.”29
This Part takes a different view. A more complete account of judicial
decision-making assigns judges a much more active and influential role.
Unlike the legal model, which assigns no role to the judge other than the
robotic search for correct legal answers, this is an account that understands
judges as individuals with goals and political preferences that they wish to
see reflected in legal outcomes. These preferences will vary from one
judge to the next, which in turn means that the identity of the deciding
judge will make all the difference in the world. But there is more.
According to the strategic model, a judge is not free to express her political
attitudes at will irrespective of everything else. Instead, a judge must
account for the relevant political context and the attitudes and likely
responses of other institutions.30 To act strategically, in other words, is to
keep in mind one’s preferences while keeping an eye on the likely
responses of others.
Chief Justice Marshall’s actions surrounding Marbury v. Madison31
offer a paradigmatic example.32 Marshall knew full well that the
27
While this Part focuses on the work of the U.S. Supreme Court, its teachings could be applied
to all courts generally, including all lower courts.
28
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS, at x (1986).
29
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2001).
30
See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 9–10; Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48
DUKE L.J. 511, 526 (1998) (book review) (“Strategy within the Court is generally conducted with an
eye to external constituencies. The decision to accept a case may be influenced by the potential public
and governmental reaction to the Court’s involvement.”).
31
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32
See Robert Lowry Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A
Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 285, 285–86 (1994) (arguing that
Marshall, during Marbury v. Madison, behaved rationally so as to achieve his objectives); Jack Knight
& Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 87, 95 (1996) (placing
the Court’s decision to hear Marbury in a political context). For other examples, see Lee Epstein &
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administration of President Jefferson would not deliver the commissions in
question.33 Rather than risk such a stinging rebuke, Marshall offered a
reading of the constitutional text that allowed him to both assert the duty to
interpret the document while at the same time feigning impotence to do as
required.34 But Marbury hardly stood alone, for Marshall “often voted
strategically” and “sustained laws he thought unconstitutional when more
aggressive judicial action would damage the political foundations for
judicial review.”35 To vote his sincere preferences, in other words, would
risk retaliatory actions from the political branches.
This Part argues that acceptance of the strategic model as an accurate
depiction of the Supreme Court and its work immediately demands a
passive role for the Court. This is not true as a general proposition, since
“law is clearly the domain of the courts,” which necessarily means that
they should not defer to the judgments and conclusions of the political
branches on questions of law.36 The argument is particularly apt when the
Court enters the field of political questions, that is, when the Court faces
questions of representation and democratic theory in general. This is true
for two reasons.
First, the types of questions raised here are particularly intractable and
devoid of right answers. All that a judge can do is offer her preferred
answers. For example, and as the remainder of this Essay argues, how
does a judge choose from among the many variables that inform any
redistricting challenge? This is, in a nutshell, Frankfurter’s challenge:
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary
complexity, involving—even after the fundamental
theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a
representative legislature have been fought out or
compromised—considerations of geography, demography,
electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or
Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the Reconstruction
Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315, 316 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (“Justices do not decide a priori
to protect minority rights or to legitimate the ruling regime. Rather, they base their votes on their
political ideologies, with a consequence being that liberal justices tend to protect minority interests,
whereas conservative ones tend to legitimate the ruling regime.”) and Josh Benson, The Guantánamo
Game: A Public Choice Perspective on Judicial Review in Wartime, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1219
(2009) (discussing the Court’s increasing role in shaping the detention policies at Guantánamo Bay).
33
Kent Greenfield, Law, Politics, and the Erosion of Legitimacy in the Delaware Courts, 55
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 481, 483 (2010–11) (“President Thomas Jefferson had made it known that he was
not prepared to abide by any decision holding against him . . . .”).
34
Id. at 484 (“The Court held that the Constitution did not allow the Court to have original
jurisdiction over mandamus petitions, and the federal act that purported to give it such jurisdiction was
therefore unconstitutional. In giving up its power to hear the case, the Court seized the power of
judicial review . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
35
Mark A. Graber, The Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review, in THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 28, 41 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999).
36
Cross & Nelson, supra note 29, at 1449.
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divergencies among particular local groups, communications,
the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and
the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage,
respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior
status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant
data, and a host of others.37
Think what you want about Justice Frankfurter’s brand of
conservatism, he had a powerful point. Choosing among these many
variables is certainly difficult, and the U.S. Constitution offers hardly any
help at all.38 Choosing among them is an unbounded choice.
Second, once the courts step into the political process, the conclusion
that they will play a direct role in deciding who wins and who loses as a
matter of law is not hard to reach. Worse yet, they will so decide in
accordance with their personal goals and values, not in accordance with
choices bound by the constitutional text.39 The argument is actually quite
straight-forward. It only requires two steps: first, that judges have personal
preferences that they wish to see reflected in legal outcomes; and second,
that these goals are not particularly tempered by the fact that a judge is
facing questions of politics. Once we assume that these two steps are true,
the conclusion follows that judges have a direct hand in deciding political
winners and losers.
For a fitting example, we need to look no further than Bush v. Gore,40
though the case does not stand alone. This case had it all: a political
controversy of the highest order, carried out in a public stage unlike any
other; a swing Justice—Justice O’Connor—expressing frustration that her
preferred candidate would not win a crucial state—Florida;41 and an
uncertain judicial canvass, which allowed the Justices to arrive at any
conclusion they so desired. This is not to say that Bush v. Gore was wrong
as a matter of law, but rather, it is to say that the Justices had almost
unfettered discretion in deciding the case. So long as they could trust that
the sitting President would not intervene in any way—declare martial law,
37

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers . . . .”).
39
See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1408 (2001) (“In addition, Bush v. Gore was troubling because it suggested that the Court was
motivated by a particular kind of partisanship, one much more narrow than the promotion of broad
political principles through the development of constitutional doctrine. The distinction is between the
‘high’ politics of political principle and the ‘low’ politics of partisan advantage.”).
40
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
41
Balkin, supra note 39, at 1440 n.98 (relating reports that Justice O’Connor may have become
visibly upset at initial reports that Al Gore had won Florida).
38
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for example, or maybe deploy the armed forces in the name of
“freedom”—and so long as they could trust that the sitting Congress would
also stay on the sidelines—a likely proposition in light of the composition
of the 110th Congress—the Justices could do as they wished. And that is
exactly what they did.42
To argue that questions of politics inevitably thrust the Court in the
middle of partisan controversies is neither new nor controversial. Justice
Frankfurter warned as much over half a century ago.43 The better question
is, how should the Court respond to this reality? One answer is to return to
the constitutional world when the Court did not take on these questions at
all. This is the world of Colegrove v. Green.44 But this Essay does not
necessarily agree that this is a good idea. Instead, this Essay argues that a
middle ground exists between non-intervention and aggressive judicial
review. The case was Baker v. Carr.45
III. A MODEL FOR INTERVENTION: BAKER V. CARR
Baker arose from the unwillingness of state legislators in Tennessee to
redraw its state districting lines for decades.46 Their reasons were clearly
self-interested, since these were the very districting lines that ensured the
legislators’ success at the polls.47 They had little incentive to act.
Complicating matters was the lack of the initiative or referendum process
in Tennessee.48 The voters were essentially trapped in a quandary not of
their own making. They could not vote the rascals out of office, for the
districts were grossly malapportioned and uncompetitive, but they also
could not circumvent the process on their own, since the state did not
afford them that choice. The political process was frozen, locked up, and
voters were devoid of any recourse.
This context made Baker an easy point-of-entry for the Court into the
42
See id. at 1442 (recounting an argument that “[t]he Justices used the forms of legal argument to
arrive at a particular result that suited their respective political ideologies”).
43
See Colegrove v. Green, 328. U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (noting that “due regard for the effective
working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not
meet for judicial determination”); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court’s ‘judicial Power’ not
only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces by which
the relation between population and representation has time out of mind been and now is determined.”).
44
328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding that, in an action challenging changes to Illinois voting
districts, “[t]o sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress” and “Courts
ought not to enter this political thicket”).
45
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
46
See id. at 191 (“In more than 60 years since [the 1901] action, all proposals in both Houses of
the [Tennessee] General Assembly for reapportionment have failed to pass.”).
47
See id. at 193 (“Appellants also argue that, because of the composition of the legislature
effected by the 1901 Apportionment Act, redress in the form of state constitutional amendment to
change the entire mechanism for reapportioning, or any other change short of that, is difficult or
impossible.”).
48
Id. at 193–94 n.14.
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political process. All the Court needed to do was demonstrate a
willingness to police this area of the law, and the states and federal courts
would take care of the rest. This is the conventional wisdom, which argues
that the Justices in Baker simply agreed on answers to basic procedural
questions—whether the case presented a classic political question, for
example, or whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case at all—
while setting aside substantive questions for another day.49 This is a
common reading bolstered by Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in the
case.50 Justice Stewart’s opinion is particularly important because he was
the Justice whose vote controlled the outcome of the Baker litigation for
some time. In the end, his opinion reads as nothing more than an effort to
control the future of this nascent doctrinal area. According to Justice
Stewart, all Justices but himself missed the big picture. In his words:
The complaint in this case asserts that Tennessee’s system
of apportionment is utterly arbitrary—without any possible
justification in rationality. The District Court did not reach the
merits of that claim, and this Court quite properly expresses no
view on the subject. Contrary to the suggestion of my Brother
Harlan, the Court does not say or imply that “state legislatures
must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality
the voice of every voter.” The Court does not say or imply
that there is anything in the Federal Constitution “to prevent a
State, acting not irrationally, from choosing any electoral
legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests,
temper, and customs of its people.” And contrary to the
suggestion of my Brother Douglas, the Court most assuredly
does not decide the question, “may a State weight the vote of
one county or one district more heavily than it weights the vote
in another?”51
Justice Stewart argues his point yet offers no evidence to support it.
His reading of the import of the majority opinion in Baker is one of many
readings. And much better readings were offered at the time.
Consider, for example, the majority opinion on its own terms. Here is
what it said on the question of judicial standards, the question at the heart
of the disagreement between the Justices: “Judicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been
49
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting
Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2002) [hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer,
Baker’s Promise].
50
Baker, 369 U.S. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects
no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”52 These words
could not be any clearer. How else to understand them but as an attempt to
situate the facts in Baker within the constitutional law orthodoxy? Once
Baker opened the door for the Court to consider questions of politics, this
passage assumes that these questions would be handled as all other
questions under the Equal Protection Clause. Any other reading of the
opinion is simply implausible and far too charitable to Justice Stewart and
his attempt to control the meaning of Baker.
A better argument understands Baker as a perfect example of strategic
decision-making. For quite some time, judicial intervention remained
uncertain.53 Once Justice Clark agreed to side with the Brennan majority,
the case broke.54 Only two Justices—Frankfurter55 and Harlan56—filed
dissents in the case. Finding common ground proved far more difficult.57
Some Justices were quite comfortable pressing claims of vote dilution, that
is, questioning “the extent to which a State may weight one person’s vote
more heavily than it does another’s.”58 Others viewed the Court as the
only institution capable of unlocking the political process and “would not
consider intervention by [the] Court into so delicate a field if there were
any other relief available to the people of Tennessee.”59 This is because,
according to Justice Clark, the people of Tennessee were “caught up in a
legislative strait jacket.”60
Reaching a majority within the Court was only the first step. Two
difficulties remained. The first was the tenor of the times and the Court’s
standing in the public eye. Think here about some of the more recent cases
in the Court’s docket, from Brown61 and Brown II62 to Cooper v. Aaron,63
Naim v. Naim,64 and Williams v. Georgia.65 These are cases where the
52

Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its
Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 676 (1962) (describing how the “lower
courts had little choice except to follow” Supreme Court precedent on “litigation concerning districting
practices”).
54
Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, supra note 49, at 1365.
55
Baker, 369 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 330 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
57
Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, supra note 49, at 1362–63.
58
Baker, 369 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59
Id. at 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
60
Id. at 259.
61
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
63
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
64
350 U.S. 891 (1955); see also Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme
Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1475–76 (1994) (stating that
some Justices were concerned about the political effect the Court’s ruling could have and that the Court
chose not to decide the case even though it was legally obligated to do so); Gregory Michael Dorr,
53
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Court demonstrated an acute awareness of the political context of the time
and the fact that the Justices could not assume that its decisions will be
readily accepted by the relevant publics. These cases ensured, in other
words, that the question of judicial impact was fresh on their minds.
One answer is that the Court was keenly aware of the reception that
race cases received by Southern publics, while redistricting controversies
were a different matter. But this was simply not so. Or at the very least,
the Court could not be sure that redistricting cases would be received any
differently than race cases. This was the second difficulty facing the
Court. Prodded by Justice Frankfurter, the Court could not ignore the fact
that to decide these redistricting questions would be to step into political
embroilments, “in the sense of party contests and party interests.”66
Redistricting battles are, in other words, “overwhelmingly party or intraparty contests.”67 Think what you want about Justice Frankfurter, but he
was right about the nature of the redistricting process. To side with
Frankfurter on this point, however, was not to decide the ultimate question:
Should the Court step into this political minefield and take sides in these
political controversies? To Frankfurter, the answer was clear: “It will add
a virulent source of friction and tension in federal-state relations to embroil
the federal judiciary in [party contests].”68
With the eyes of the nation fixed on the Court,69 the Justices faced a
difficult challenge. This is where the strategic account helps us understand
what happened in Baker. To the Court’s majority, the answer was not to
stay out, but instead, to intervene cautiously, carefully, even
apprehensively.70 Justice Brennan wrote an opinion long on cases and
doctrine and short on specifics. This was because he was almost begging
his readers to believe that the Court was not engaging in politics, but law.
Readers versed in law were not impressed, and it is quite easy to parse
through the law reviews of the time and find leading voices in
Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119,
120–22 (1998) (stating that the Court’s decision was based upon political considerations and concerns
about judicial activism).
65
349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955); see also Dickson, supra note 64, at 1478 (noting that the Supreme
Court would have issued a harsh response, but the Court was concerned that the case would “cost the
Court too dearly in terms of image and authority”).
66
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).
67
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68
Id.
69
See Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56
(1962) (writing in the aftermath of Baker that “no development since the Segregation Cases has so
focused the public eye on the doings of the Court” (internal citations omitted)).
70
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209, 211 (“[T]he mere fact that [a] suit seeks protection of a political
right does not mean it presents a [nonjusticiable] political question . . . . Deciding whether a matter has
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.” (emphasis added)).
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constitutional law railing against the Court on this point. But this was not
the Court’s intended audience. The real audience was elsewhere, in state
legislatures, courtrooms, and the nation at large. How would these publics
respond?
It is hard to overstate the degree to which the Court’s decision was
accepted across the country. In the words of Robert McCloskey:
[I]t is hard to recall a decision in modern history which has
had such an immediate and significant effect on the practical
course of events, or—again excepting the Segregation
Cases—which seems to contain such a potential for
influencing that course in the future. The short-term
response has been nothing short of astonishing. It has been
as if the decision catalyzed a new political synthesis that was
already straining, so to speak, to come into being. Not only
federal judges, but state judges as well, have taken the inch
or so of encouragement offered by the Supreme Court and
stretched it out to a mile. Legislatures all over the country
have been bidden to redistrict or to face the prospect of
having the judiciary do the job for them. Under this spur,
and sometimes in anticipation of it, a number of them have
set going their laborious machinery of conflict and
compromise. The shape of the apportionment plans that will
emerge from this strange confluence of judicial and
legislative power remains to be seen, but there can be no
doubt that the American political world is stirring.72
More importantly, this reception makes it clear that the Court was on
the right side of public opinion. The question was no longer whether the
Court would step into this political terrain, but how far it was willing to go.
Professor McCloskey could not be sure, yet conjectured that “the decision,
even without further adumbration, may precipitate a train of events that
will alter profoundly the nature of representation in American politics.”73
He would not need to wait long to get an inkling about the Court’s next
71
See, e.g., Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (1962) (noting that the Court in Baker did not
indicate anywhere in its decision what standards might be used to determine the validity of an
apportionment scheme that creates inequalities of individual voting power); Philip B. Kurland,
Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 175 (1964) (noting that as courts continue to strive towards
omnipotence, law reviews “will continue to play the game of evaluating the Court’s work in light of the
fictions of the law . . . rather than deal with the realities of politics and statesmanship”); Phil C. Neal,
Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 253 (describing the Baker decision
as an “incipient judicial reformation of our political structure”).
72
McCloskey, supra note 69, at 56–58 (internal citation omitted).
73
Id. at 59.
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step. The case was Reynolds v. Sims.

IV. THE ROAD TAKEN: FROM REYNOLDS TO THE MODERN WORLD OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Once the Justices saw that they were riding a high wave of public
sentiment, the promise of Baker soon gave way to a much more assertive
alternative. The Court need not be a passive participant in this debate but,
instead, it could actually lead it. More specifically, the Court could face
Frankfurter’s challenge and take sides, and in so doing it could decide
which of those factors would form part of a larger constitutional mandate.75
But make no mistake: Choosing among these factors would be an exercise
in will, not law. The constitutional text is simply unclear, even silent, on
which of these factors must control the redistricting process.76 So long as
the Justices were on the side of democracy and public opinion, however,
nothing else mattered.
This is the best way to explain Reynolds v. Sims and its enshrinement
of population equality.77 The Justices settled on a mantra—one man, one
vote—and imposed it on the states confident that compliance would
follow.78 This was strategic acting at its best, down to the choice of
slogans. After all, who could possibly be against according everybody one
vote?
But where Baker was a necessary yet cautious move into a difficult
terrain, Reynolds was its mirror opposite, both substantively and
institutionally. Substantively, Reynolds cannot be defended as
constitutional law. To say that the Equal Protection Clause demands
population equality will not do. As Justice Harlan remarked in dissent:
Whatever may be thought of this holding as a piece of
political ideology—and even on that score the political
history and practices of this country from its earliest
beginnings leave wide room for debate—I think it
demonstrable that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
74

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 323–24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing the considerations
involved in the complex subject of apportionment and noting that these are “not factors that lend
themselves to evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determination or for which judges
are equipped to adjudicate . . . .”).
76
See, e.g., id. at 323 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause supplies no clearer guide for judicial
examination of apportionment methods than would the Guarantee Clause itself.”).
77
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579 (“Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding
objective must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.”).
78
See id. at 558 (“[W]e concluded: ‘The conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.’” (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 381 (1963))).
75
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impose this political tenet on the States or authorize this
Court to do so.79
Justice Frankfurter presaged this argument in his dissent in Baker, where
he wrote: “What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose
among competing bases of representation—ultimately, really, among
competing theories of political philosophy—in order to establish an
appropriate frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby
for all the States of the Union.”80 The argument required much more than
a bow to the equality principle, but the Court was not interested in offering
anything more. It clearly did not have to do so.
Institutionally, the Court was usurping the role of state legislatures for
no better reason than the fact that it disagreed with their choices. To make
sense of how monumental this fateful step was, go back to Frankfurter’s
challenge once again.81 Clearly, state actors in charge of redistricting may
choose from myriad factors for reasons suited to the particular needs of
their states, or even for no reason at all. The same is not true of the Court.
Judicial intervention requires more. The Court needs a reason to act. This
is why Baker makes sense in ways that Reynolds does not. Once the
locked up process in Baker gave way to change, the Court could step back
and let the political process run its course. Further judicial intervention
required a new argument, but the Court did not see it that way. Instead, to
the Justices, Baker gave the Court license in perpetuity to mold the
political process to its liking. The Court could do as it wished, confident
that its edicts would be carried out. It is hard to overstate this point. The
Court could even declare all fifty state legislatures unconstitutional.82
The immediate aftermath of the Reynolds revolution underscores this
point. Rumblings from Congress took aim at Reynolds and the “one
person, one vote”83 principle,84 but they eventually fizzled out and led
nowhere. The amendment process proved far too difficult to overcome.85
In the meantime, the equipopulation principle quickly became the law of
the land, accepted by state legislatures and state and federal courts.86 The
79

Id. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II (explaining Frankfurter’s challenge).
82
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In these cases the Court holds
that seats in the legislatures of six States are apportioned in ways that violate the Federal Constitution.
Under the Court’s ruling it is bound to follow that the legislatures in all but a few of the other 44 States
will meet the same fate.” (footnote omitted)).
83
Id. at 587 (Clark, J., concurring).
84
Dixon, supra note 19, at 231–37 (describing proposed bills and constitutional amendments in
response to the reapportionment court decisions).
85
See Everett McKinley Dirksen, The Supreme Court and the People, 66 MICH. L. REV. 837, 859
(1968) (stating that a proposed constitutional amendment did not receive the necessary votes and failed
in the Senate); Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255, 256
(1964) (outlining the logistical difficulties in amending the Constitution).
86
McKay, supra note 85, at 258–59.
80
81

2011]

LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD PHILOSOPHER KINGS

1173

matter was thus settled. The Court could mold the political process to its
liking and face few if any repercussions for its actions. This was precisely
the moment when the Court began to take over the field of election law at a
dizzying pace. Some of these intrusions were quite expected, such as
burdensome ballot access laws and racial vote dilution inquiries. But the
Court was also unafraid to strike deep into the heart of Congress. For not
only was the Court willing to rewrite federal statutes to its liking,87 but the
Justices were also willing to look Congress directly in the eye and usurp
the apparent congressional right to “be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications
of its own Members . . . .”88 Moving ahead, in other words, it appeared
that there was nothing the Court could not do.
V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: BACK TO THE GERRYMANDER
The stage is now set to better understand the questions at the heart of
the gerrymandering debate. The big question today is this: Should the
Court look for guidance to Baker and its promise of deferential review, or
should it look instead to the more aggressive posture introduced by
Reynolds and continued by the Court since? More specifically, the
question is whether the Court should take the lead in organizing and
regulating our political institutions or whether it should allow these
institutions to regulate and structure themselves subject to broad and
forgiving guidelines. These are not easy questions yet they are largely
ignored. To properly understand their importance, we must parse the
discussion into three separate strands.
A. Frankfurter’s Challenge and the Problem of Drawing Lines
The first is the practical/descriptive problem of judicial line-drawing as
applied to the gerrymandering question.
Assuming that political
considerations are legitimate factors for political actors to consider when
drawing districting lines, the critique of the practice boils down to the
argument that political factors cannot play too central a role. Political
factors cannot predominate in the process and overwhelm all other factors.
This is a version of Frankfurter’s challenge.89 How confident can we be
that the Court will be able to separate the legitimate use of political factors
from illegitimate uses?
87
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 236 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Congress intended to regulate all aspects of federal campaign finances, but what
remains after today’s holding leaves no more than a shadow of what Congress contemplated.”).
88
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–50 (1969)
(holding “that in judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution” and that the political question doctrine does not bar courts
from interpreting the law in regards to the eligibility of members of Congress).
89
See supra Part II.
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B. The Strategic Model in the World of Politics
This leads directly to the second problem. Recall the argument that
judicial decision-making is essentially a strategic accommodation of the
Justices’ personal goals and values.90 Once we agree on this premise, a
very troubling conclusion follows as applied to the gerrymandering
problem when considered as a judicial question. For in the end, it follows
that the Justices will draw their preferred lines as a direct reflection of their
personal preferences about how they wish the political process to be
structured. In other words, to the prior line-drawing question—how to
separate the legitimate from the illegitimate uses of race—the answer must
be that the Justices will simply choose their preferred answers and ipse
dixit call them legitimate, while anything outside their universe of
acceptable answers will be similarly labeled illegitimate. The only
constraints will be external to the Court. In the post-Reynolds world of
judicial review, these constraints are almost non-existent, assuming they
ever existed at all.
This is another way of saying that the Court can do as it wishes so long
as it stays within some very flexible and relaxed limits. Yet, anyone
familiar with the Court’s recent turn in the political gerrymandering
jurisprudence must wonder about ways to explain the Court’s reticence to
regulate this area. Take Vieth v. Jubelirer as an example.91 In Vieth, the
Justices considered whether the political gerrymandering doctrine is a
quixotic quest worth pursuing, or whether it is time to declare the quest
insoluble and not worth the effort.92 Predictably, the Justices split along
traditional lines. Four conservative Justices declared that the doctrine was
not worth the effort and it was time to place these cases within the ambit of
political questions as traditionally understood.93 They argued that
judicially manageable standards are lacking—that is, that they are unable
to meet Frankfurter’s challenge—and so the Court should simply give up
the fight.94 The four moderate Justices argued instead that such standards
were in fact availing, and they offered their preferred alternatives.95 These
Justices are on the side of history. There is no good reason why this
challenge is any different than the challenges of the past. Justice Kennedy
90

See supra Part II.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 271–72.
93
See id. at 305 (holding that the Constitution does not “provide[] a judicially enforceable limit
on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take into account when districting”).
94
See id. at 281 (stating that after “[e]ighteen years of judicial effort . . . no judicially discernible
and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged”).
95
See id. at 335–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that courts could use the racial
gerrymandering standard to decide political gerrymandering cases); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing for the adoption of a standard requiring plaintiffs to make out a prima facie after which states
could rebut and offer their justifications); id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the courts could
identify indicia of political abuse).
91
92
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found himself in the middle, willing to wrestle with Frankfurter’s
challenge into the foreseeable future.96 In the meantime, the doctrine
remains in flux.
Vieth offers a refreshing example of a struggle we no longer see within
the law of democracy between judicial intervention and restraint. It is
tempting to side with the conservatives and their willingness to remove the
Court from this particular question. This view, however, would miss the
far more interesting and important questions at the heart of Vieth. How
should we understand any move on the part of the Justices to give up the
chance to impose their political goals on democratic structures and
institutions? What drove Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion? This question
presupposes that the law is open-ended and does not lead to the conclusion
to which Justice Scalia wished to take us.97 But Reynolds already
foreclosed this move. This is about volition and will, not law, and neither
is in short supply. This question also presupposes that the political process
is no longer able or willing to fight back. Bush v. Gore teaches us as
much. So the only remaining question is that of political goals. What
could possibly lie behind the conservatives’ move in Vieth? What
particular goals were being furthered?
To make sense of this question, compare the Court’s approach in Vieth
to the confusing Shaw doctrine. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court held for the
first time that a districting plan that neither harms voters of color nor
dilutes their vote is an actionable claim under the equal protection clause.98
In the majority’s view, a districting map that was irregular on its face and
which ultimately elected a candidate of color to office bore the uneasy
markings of Jim Crow segregation.99 Such a map, according to the
majority, created two related harms. The first was a harm to society as a
whole, since it “reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”100 The second
harm was a representational harm, in that the officials elected from the
offending district “are more likely to believe that their primary obligation
is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole.”101 These harms are generally known as
96

Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that the lack of judicial standards for political
gerrymandering makes the Court’s intervention improper, but recognizing a potential role for the
judiciary if workable standards emerge).
97
See id. at 306 (majority opinion) (“Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have
persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that
case, and decline to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”).
98
509 U.S. 630, 653–54 (1993).
99
Id. at 647.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 648.
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expressive harms.
These harms were also nonsense, for reasons that scholars have been
quick to point out in the aftermath of the Shaw case.103 Their development
and ultimate demise were also easy to explain under the strategic model.
Begin with the policy goal: Conservative Justices are generally unreceptive
to the use of race by state actors, so they are distrustful of bizarre maps
used largely by Southern jurisdictions to send Black and Latino elected
officials to the U.S. Congress. The Shaw doctrine is best understood as a
direct reaction to a particular use of race in redistricting that made
conservative Justices uncomfortable. But there is quite a gap between
discomfort and unconstitutionality, especially when the facts in Shaw fit
comfortably within established case law, most notably United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey.104 Fully aware of this
problem, the Court was forced to concede that the Shaw doctrine
established an “analytically distinct claim.”105 The claim was so distinct,
in fact, that it evolved in the next case to the better known “predominant
factor” test.106 Though scholars worried about how the claim would affect
the post-2000 redistricting round and what kind of chaos it would cause,107
the claim disappeared altogether, never to be seen again.
The evolution of the Shaw doctrine teaches us that the Justices’ policy
goals can go a long way in determining what shape legal doctrine will take.
A determined Court majority will go to great lengths to see its policy views
expressed in law. This is true even when legal precedent is unhelpful, or
common sense lacking. One reading of Shaw sees it as a signal on the part
of the Court to political actors—and particularly Department of Justice
officials—that their aggressive use of race in redistricting must stop. This
102
See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
485 (1993) (“Shaw must be understood to rest on a distinctive conception of the kinds of harms against
which the Constitution protects . . . . We call these expressive harms, as opposed to more familiar,
material harms.”).
103
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the
New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 304–06 (2001)
(arguing that the “expressive harms doctrine” is incoherent once districts are comprised of less than
fifty percent of minority voters); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in
the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 293–95, 295 n.52 (1996) (stating that there are causality
problems and questions the Court left unanswered regarding Shaw’s representational harm theory).
104
See 430 U.S. 144, 145, 168 (1977) (affirming the district court’s holding that officials may use
racial considerations in seeking corrective action under the Voting Rights Act).
105
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652.
106
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show, either
through the circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence
going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.”).
107
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment after the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1998) (explaining how complicated and contentious the post-2000
reapportionment may become, due to the burdens imposed by federal law and a potential increase in
litigation over the composition of districts).
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is certainly a plausible reading.
A far more persuasive reading views
Shaw and its progeny as a failed experiment. What in 1994 looked like a
good idea, even a necessary one, by 1998 looked like a total mess. To its
credit, the Rehnquist Court appreciated this fact and discarded Shaw to the
dustbin of history.109 These policy goals must be pursued elsewhere,
through different means.
This discussion should help us understand the political gerrymandering
puzzle. Shaw is explained as driven by a strong aversion to the use of race
in public policy. Similarly, in the political gerrymandering context, the
dissenting Justices in Vieth expressed a very common and widely accepted
abhorrence for the lengths to which politicians will go to get re-elected.110
This reaction is captured by the expression that the politicians pick their
representatives rather than the other way around.111 This is also why Vieth
is directly connected to Shaw: The dissenters in Vieth, like the Shaw
majority, were giving expression to their deeply held policy views, clothed
in the garb of legal doctrine. Thus, the puzzle restated: What drove the
conservative plurality in its wish to see the Court leave the political
gerrymandering question for the political branches to resolve? One
Justice’s opinion we can decipher is Justice Kennedy. As the Court’s
swing voter, he was hesitant to give up a wide swath of legal doctrine that
he was able to control. Those in power do not give up that power easily.
But how can Scalia’s opinion be explained? How do the Justices that
readily decided Bush v. Gore, Citizens United, and are presently pondering
the demise of the Voting Rights Act willingly give up on political
gerrymandering questions? This question is particularly puzzling when
one considers that any Court that strikes at the heart of the political
gerrymander is clearly on the side of public opinion. This is BakerReynolds redux, and the consensus is not as hidden now as it might have
been back in the early 1960s. It is now as clear as day.
One answer takes a page out of the attitudinal model. It may just be
the case that the conservative Justices assume that conservative politicians
108
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38, 50 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the interpretation of
Miller as “a stinging rebuke of the DOJ itself and its preclearance practices” with regard to the Voting
Rights Act).
109
Put another way, prior to the 2000 redistricting season, scholars worried about the effect of an
aggressive judicial pursuit of the Shaw-Miller doctrine. See Karlan, supra note 107. And yet, the
expected litigation that followed the 2000 Census did not see any such litigation arise? The Justices
were no longer interested in pursuing this line of attack, and Shaw suffered a silent death.
110
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 318 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In my view, when
partisanship is the legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken
unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage—the governing
body cannot be said to have acted impartially.”).
111
See, e.g., Leon W. Russel & J. Gerald Hebert, Let the Voters Speak, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, at 11A (describing gerrymandering as a “practice that for decades has enabled
politicians to choose their voters instead of voters choosing politicians”).
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and voters benefit far more from political gerrymandering practices as they
exist today than do liberal and progressive voters and politicians.112 There
seems to be a pretty good body of evidence to support that view, as liberals
do not appear to have an answer to Lee Atwater and Karl Rove.113 On this
view, when the Court removes itself as an institutional player in the
gerrymandering debate, it benefits conservative policies while conserving
its political capital to use elsewhere.
A less cynical yet far less convincing answer is that the conservative
Justices are sincerely ambivalent about their views on this question. While
some people feel strongly about the harmful effects of the political
gerrymander, it may just be the case that the conservative Justices do not
feel similarly. And if their views are not all that strong, why bother taking
a side?
C. Searching in Vain for a Few Good Philosopher Kings
The third problem addresses the normative implications of the political
gerrymandering debate. This is a question that, properly understood,
begins precisely in the same place as the Baker/Reynolds debate. This is
also a question that must similarly confront Frankfurter’s challenge. As
understood and carried on today, however, scholars bypass the difficult
question at the heart of the gerrymandering debate and instead turn the
Justices into philosopher kings. But this is too easy.
For context, look back to the early 1960s. Redistricting maps in state
after state looked the same. After years of inaction yet much migration
both intra- and interstate, districts bear no semblance of rationality in terms
of population. In Alabama, for example, some districts have forty-one
times as many people as other districts.114 The question is whether such
disparities violate constitutional principles. The answer in Baker was yes.
Properly read, Baker left the districting task in the hands of political actors,
where it should be. How is one to decide among the many bases of
representation, after all, and which institution should be in charge of
deciding it? In Reynolds, the Court entrusted itself with this delicate
political task and imposes the principle of political equality upon the
states.115 As suggested earlier, this is an act of volition and will, not
constitutional law. The Court offered no persuasive—or constitutional—
112
See Sanford Levinson, Why Didn’t the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case?
Some Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1499 (2009) (“[I]t has
been, generally speaking, Republicans who have benefited overall from the significant use of racial
criteria in designing electoral districts, and Democrats, concomitantly, who have paid significant
costs.”).
113
See Dan Balz, Team Bush: The Iron Triangle, WASH. POST, July 23, 1999, at C1 (discussing
President George W. Bush’s trio of political advisers).
114
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964).
115
Id. at 557.
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basis for its conclusion.
Once the Court made this crucial move, the gerrymandering debate
should follow a similar path. These cases ask the same question about
political representation. Justice Douglas understood the issue in the early
1970s:
The question of the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds
v. Sims. Fair representation of voters in a legislative
assembly—one man, one vote—would seem to require (1)
substantial equality of population within each district and (2)
the avoidance of district lines that weigh the power of one
race more heavily than another. The latter can be done—and
is done—by astute drawing of district lines that makes the
district either heavily Democratic or heavily Republican as
the case may be. Lines may be drawn so as to make the
voice of one racial group weak or strong, as the case may
be.116
Justice Douglas made a number of moves worth highlighting. Note
first how he defined the concept of “fair representation” as simply “one
man, one vote.” Note further how population equality as a principle of
representation did not demand strict equality but rather substantial equality.
This left room for play and accommodation. This was also consistent with
Baker v. Carr.117 Note finally how Justice Douglas glossed over a question
that confounds the Justices to this day—the question at the heart of the
Shaw doctrine. To the modern Court, the use of politics is permissible in
ways that the use of race is not. The better inquiry tries to distinguish
between the use of race and politics in a world where African Americans
vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates—an issue about which the
Court was not terribly clear.118 In contrast, Justice Douglas conflated the
two inquiries and in so doing took care of the political and racial
gerrymandering questions in one fell swoop.
Whatever one thinks of Justice Douglas’s approach to constitutional
law, he recognized the connection between the early cases and the
gerrymandering debate. In recent years, if for slightly different reasons,
Justice Stevens also recognized a connection.119
116

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176–77 (1971) (internal citation omitted).
See Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, supra note 49, at 1382 (arguing that Baker and
Reynolds have created a flexible standard for lower courts to follow, rather than a rule of strict
population equality).
118
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (stating that when race correlates strongly
with political behavior, “[t]he basic question is whether the legislature drew District 12’s boundaries
because of race rather than because of political behavior”).
119
See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949−50 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he equalpopulation principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, and we must be
careful not to dilute its strength.”).
117
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Once we see the cases for what they aremirror images of one
anotherthe question at the heart of the political gerrymandering cases
comes into sharper focus. Should the Court follow the path forged by
Baker v. Carr, with its promise of due deference to the political branches?
Or should it follow Reynolds and its implicit premise that the Court is the
best institution to decide these charged and complex questions of political
representation? This is, in a nutshell, the political gerrymandering
debate—a question of institutional competence regarding redistricting.120
This Essay sides with Baker and its position of due deference. The
best way to make sense of judicial intervention in redistricting focuses on
Justice Clark’s concurring opinion in Baker and the idea that the Court
must play a backstop role.121 This was an argument for a passive judicial
role, for allowing much play in the joints and leeway for the states to
devise their political institutions as they see fit. This argument has much to
commend it, both as a question of democratic theory and as a question of
constitutional law. Democratic theory also faces up to the challenge posed
by Justice Frankfurter: How should we structure our democratic
institutions, and which institution should bear the responsibility for doing
so?122 This is a political question in its truest sense, in that it demands the
accommodation of myriad factors that are often in tension with one
another. For example, are at-large elections preferable to districted
elections?
Are competitive elections superior to non-competitive
elections? Which political interests deserve to be included in our
representative bodies? Should districting plans include Black and Latino
districts? And assuming that we agree that these districts should be
included, what percentage of Black and Latino residents should be
included within these districts?
These are difficult and contested questions—questions without right
answers. Without more, they are questions better left to the political
process, to the pulling, hauling and trading of politics.123 They are not
judicial questions.
The Constitution directly supports this view. The clear mandate of
120
See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984) (explaining that an institutional approach
to constitutional law involves choosing a principal decisionmaker from among the government
institutions, and considering the strengths and weaknesses of the government institutions).
121
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (“We therefore must conclude
that the people of Tennessee are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the
present discrimination in the affairs of their state government.”).
122
Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing the considerations relevant to determining
proper apportionment methods).
123
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (explaining that while “society’s racial
and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and
electoral opportunity,” there are instances in which minorities are able to form coalitions, as “minority
voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political
ground . . . .”).
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Article I places the responsibility to structure our political institutions on
the states and assigns Congress a supervisory role.124 The states get a first
pass in answering these questions, while Congress has a reserved
constitutional prerogative to amend the states’ choices.125 Congress can
decide, for example, that states must elect members of Congress via
compact and contiguous congressional districts of equal population,126 or it
can also take a view on the representation of racial and ethnic minorities.127
To say that these are duties and responsibilities best left to the political
branches is not to say that the courts should not play a role at all. Rather,
the courts must play a secondary role, a deferential role. So long as the
political process is working properly, the courts must stay their hand.
Judicial intervention is warranted only when extreme facts are present.
This is because courts do not have institutional advantages vis-à-vis the
political process in answering these questions. As seen in Reynolds, the
courts will happily answer these questions, but that is only proof that
courts have a difficult time circumscribing their own spheres of authority.
If called upon to resolve these issues, courts will decide them. But these
would be acts of judicial will, not constitutional law.
The rub is obvious: How should courts decide when the political
process is working “properly” as opposed to improperly? When are facts
extreme enough to warrant judicial intervention? Put in the language of
modern constitutional theory: When is the political process not “deserving
of trust”?128 One popular view argues that the process is not working
properly when it is locked up, in the sense that political change is made too
difficult if not impossible.129 But even this formulation raises further
questions. For example, what does a locked-up political process look like,
and how would anybody know?
Baker offers an answer. Two aspects of the case bear repeating. First,
note that the residents of Tennessee had no way to change the political
124
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.” (internal quotations omitted)).
125
See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (“[I]t is well settled that the Elections Clause grants
Congress ‘the power to override state regulations’ by establishing uniform rules for federal elections,
binding on the States” (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832−33 (1995)).
126
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276−77 (2004) (stating instances in which Congress has
exercised its power to regulate elections, such as when it has required districts to be compact,
contiguous, and contain an equal population).
127
For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1964 has been held to govern racial gerrymandering.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs can
prevail under § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act of 1964] by demonstrating that a challenged election
practice has resulted in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on color or race.”).
128
See, e.g., Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy and Authority, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 46,
47 (1996).
129
See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1 (arguing for a more functional framework in
cases of state regulation of democratic politics).
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process in the state.
There was nothing they could have done short of
taking the streets to unlock the political process. This fact became obvious
only after many decades of inaction. Second, the Court subjected the facts
in the case to heightened rationality.131 This is the right approach. Under
this standard, the right to decide these questions remained within the
political process, where it belonged, subject only to a loose and forgiving
rule of reason. The facts in Baker were extreme and clearly did not meet
this standard, as counsel for the state conceded during oral argument.132
Moving forward, claims under Baker should be harder to prove, as states
resume their redistricting duties.
Instead, the Court took a different path in Reynolds v. Sims. But
Reynolds can only be seen as an ipse dixit, as a moment in time when the
Justices behaved as philosopher kings. The analogy to the political
gerrymandering debate is inescapable. Commentators ask the Court to
adopt various prophylactic rules and standards, from competitive
principles133 to anti-distortion rationales.134 Commentators even take an
individual rights approach in this area.135 These accounts make for terrific
reading and might even persuade as questions of political theory. But they
ultimately fail to ask the necessary question: Is the Court the proper
institution to regulate our political process?
So understood, it follows that the Court struck the right bargain in the
frequently maligned Davis v. Bandemer.136 In Bandemer, the Court held
for the first time that political gerrymandering claims present justiciable
constitutional questions.137 The criticism of the case rises from its
application. This is because the Court offered a nebulous constitutional
standard, so nebulous, in fact, that neither judges nor scholars agree on its
meaning.138 This led to the leading critique, offered by Justice Scalia:
130

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258−59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
See Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, supra note 49.
See 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 679 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“I think the
short of the matter isand I think there’s no need to quibble about itthat the urban counties ought to
have more representation. I am not arguing that.”).
133
See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646, 683 & n.149 (arguing that a
“competitive[ly] partisan environment” is necessary to democratic politics, and explaining how the
bipartisan gerrymander “locks in the distribution of power” between parties).
134
See, e.g., Charles, supra note 2, at 607 & n.23 (“[T]he problem with political gerrymandering
is the intentional manipulation of democratic institutions by state actors.”).
135
See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 3, at 10−11 (arguing for Court intervention in the political process
that is focused on individual rights and for limitations “on the government’s power to treat people
differently in the political process”).
136
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
137
Id. at 113.
138
See Bernard Grofman, An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting
Rights Controversies: From One Person, One Vote to Partisan Gerrymandering, 21 STETSON L. REV.
783, 816 (1992) (“[A]s far as I am aware I am one of only two people who believe that Bandemer
makes sense. Moreover, the other person, Daniel Lowenstein, has a diametrically opposed view as to
what the plurality opinion means.” (footnote omitted)).
131
132
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The lower courts have lived with that assurance of a standard
(or more precisely, lack of assurance that there is no
standard), coupled with that inability to specify a standard,
for the past 18 years . . . . Nor can it be said that the lower
courts have, over 18 years, succeeded in shaping the standard
that this Court was initially unable to enunciate. They have
simply applied the standard set forth in Bandemer’s fourJustice plurality opinion. This might be thought to prove that
the four-Justice plurality standard has met the test of
timebut for the fact that its application has almost
invariably produced the same result (except for the incurring
of attorney’s fees) as would have obtained if the question
were nonjusticiable: Judicial intervention has been refused.
As one commentary has put it, “[t]hroughout its subsequent
history, Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an
invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.”139
This critique has great force yet ultimately misses the larger and more
important point. Bandemer strikes the right balance, and to say that no set
of facts has ever met its exacting standard does not detract from this fact.
Bandemer makes sense when understood as a corollary of the Baker
doctrine. Both cases worry about the same thing: the extreme case in
which incumbents can “lock themselves in power in perpetuity.”140 The
fluidity and competition inherent to the political process ensures that this
will not happen often, if ever. This is not to say that Bandemer is wrong,
or unnecessary. It is to say, instead, that Bandemer guarded against the
extreme case while according the political process needed flexibility.
Commentators are almost unanimous in their derision of the political
gerrymander.141 These accounts are often knee-jerk reactions to the
problem at hand. As to whether political gerrymanders are harmful and
concomitantly unconstitutional, the answer is often in the affirmative. In
offering their theories of choice, these commentators are clearly siding
with Reynolds, not Baker. These calls demand for the existence of
philosopher kings to choose among these many theories. These are calls,
in effect, for an activist judicial role in an area that demands judicial
deference. At the very least, this is an area that demands comparative
139
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S.
KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002)).
140
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation”
and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 575–76 (2003).
141
See, e.g., id. at 533−34 (describing commentators’ arguments against the gerrymander). But
see Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A
Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 226 (1985) (stating that the partisan
gerrymander does not “‘lock-in’ one party’s control over the state” and is less of “the great evil it is
portrayed to be”).
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institutional analysis. This is something we seldom see.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts are deeply involved in our politics. This involvement traces
back to the seminal Baker v. Carr. While Baker was a necessarily modest
opinion, the next major case, Reynolds v. Sims, took a decidedly different
approach. Where Baker was modest and deferential, Reynolds was
aggressive and hubristic. This Essay explains this shift in judicial posture
under a strategic account of judicial decision-making. In Baker, the Court
took a modest step because it could not be sure of how the relevant
political actors as well as the public would respond. Once the Justices
were sure that their rulings would receive a positive reception, they pushed
the doctrine and their authority as far as it would go. This gave us
Reynolds and its progeny. To say that the Court is able to take on these
questions is not the same as saying that the Court should do so.
This political gerrymandering question provides the Court with its next
big challenge. This Essay argues that to intervene aggressively in this area
would be to follow the example of Reynolds and the more troubling Bush
v. Gore. Based on comparative institutional analysis, however, this is an
area where the Court should instead follow the Baker model. Rather than
lead the way, the courts must play a secondary role.

